Tenth Distinction. Second Part: On the Things that can Belong to Christ’s Body in the Eucharist

202. About the second main point [n.6] I ask three questions: first whether the same body, existing naturally and existing sacramentally, necessarily has in it the same parts and properties; second whether the same immanent action that is in Christ as naturally existing exists in him as sacramentally existing in the Eucharist; third whether the body of Christ as existing in the Eucharist can have any bodily motion.

Question One. Whether the Same Body, Existing Naturally and Existing Sacramentally, Necessarily has in it the Same Parts and Properties

203. Proceeding thus to the first question, there is argument that it does not.

First, nothing can be where it was not before unless something is converted into it; but in the Eucharist nothing is converted into the properties of Christ’s body; therefore they are not there. Proof of the major: if something begins to be where it was not before, this is by some change; but there is no change in what begins to be there, because the body of Christ and all its properties remain where they uniformly were before in heaven; therefore change is in something else to which or in whose ‘where’ this body begins to be present - this is only by conversion. The minor is plain because substance alone is converted here into substance; therefore not into properties.

204. Again, second as follows: the blood is only here sacramentally after the consecration of the wine; that is, it is not under the host, first because to posit it there in another way, that is, under the species of wine, would be pointless, and second because nothing begins to be simply after it already is simply, therefore the blood does not begin to be sacramentally after it is sacramentally. But the blood is here and begins to be under the species of wine, whose consecration follows the consecration of the body. Therefore it is not here sacramentally under the species of bread. And yet the body is there. So the body does not have the same part (at least the blood) here and in heaven.

205. Third as follows: quantity cannot be together with quantity, because there is a formal repugnance between them here in respect of ‘where’, just as there is between contraries in respect of the same subject, and contraries can in no way be together because, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.6.1011b15-18 [Ord. III d.4 n.2, d.15 n.2], contradictories being true together follows on contraries being true together. Therefore, the quantity of Christ’s body, which is a property of it, cannot be in it as it is under the host. This is also plain, because quantity cannot be together with a containing quantity without being located in it, because, when a foundation and a proper term are posited, the relation between them necessarily follows. The proper foundation of being circumscribed in place is a quantum, and its term is a container. But the quantity is not circumscribed here (as is plain), so it is not here at all.

206. Again, just as in the works of nature a plurality should not be posited without necessity when following natural reason, so in matters of belief too a plurality is not to be posited that does not follow by necessary deduction from what is believed. But the whole truth of the Eucharist can be saved even if one posits here nothing but the substance alone of the body of Christ.

Proof of the minor:

Because the body can be without the soul, since it is the receptive matter and is in potency to having the soul or not having it; and it has the idea of spiritual food without the soul.

Again, the body can be without the properties, because what is naturally prior can be without what is posterior.     Therefore , without contradiction, the bare substance alone of Christ’s body could come to be here without the species. But it would be a thing sufficient for the sacrament in this way, because it would be a sign of the ultimate effect, namely spiritual nutriment; therefore etc     .

207. On the contrary:

The Master says the opposite in Sent. IV d.11 ch.6 n.1. And Innocent III says the same, On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar IV ch.12, “Christ gave to his disciples the sort of body he had.” Therefore the same quality was in the body of Christ in the Eucharist as was in it in its natural existence.

I. To the Question

208. Here two things must be looked at: first what is being supposed, second what question is being asked.

A. The Supposition being Made

209. For it is supposed that Christ’s body exists in a double way, namely in heaven in a natural way and in the Eucharist in a sacramental way.

Each point is sufficiently manifest. The first from Augustine [On John’s Gospel tr.30 n.1], and it is in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.44, “Until the end of the age, the Lord is above.” The second is manifest from what was said in question 1 earlier [nn.15-23].

210. But a doubt about the body as it is in the Eucharist concerns what the things are that it contains as parts.

211. I say that it does not contain the soul nor the accidents.

This is possible if one takes body for the thing that the soul first perfects, because there is no contradiction in this sort of body being without soul and without accidents.

212. It is also fitting, because the species represent food, and so substance and not accidents.

213. It also did in fact happen, because if the Eucharist had been consecrated during the Triduum, the true thing of the sacrament would have been there, and yet the soul would not have been there, as will be said at the end of this solution [nn.254-255, 258].

214. Also, the body does not in this way contain the blood, because this is possible and is true in fact, for blood is not animate and consequently not part of the primarily animated thing.

215. It is possible too on the part of the sacrament or in the sacrament, because in the case of different things there can be the same freely chosen sign or a different sign. The body, as taken in the stated way, differs essentially from the soul and secondarily from other things (as the blood and the like); therefore it can have a different sign. And this is proved a minori, because the body can have a natural sign that is not the same [as the sign of the blood]. For there are two essentially distinct concepts for body and blood, which concepts are the signs of conceived things, On Interpretation 2.16a19-20. And blood is essentially different from the body as the body is the thing primarily perfected by the soul. Therefore there can be a sign of it, namely of the body, that is not the same as the sign of the blood.

216. This is also proved as a fact, because it was possible for all the blood to have been separated from the body of Christ in death, and yet if the Eucharist had then been consecrated, there would have been the same thing as now. It is also possible that a large amount of the blood flowed out, and yet the whole same thing would have remained under the species of bread.

217. One must therefore hold here that the body of Christ, as it is primarily signified and contained in the species of bread, does not include the soul nor the accidents nor the blood.

B. The Question being Asked

218. As to the question asked, one must first consider the sense of the question.

219. The question here is not about the necessity of the existence of one extreme or the other, nor about the necessity of having parts or properties absolutely. But the question is about the necessity of concomitance or consequence, namely whether there are parts or properties in the body of Christ, or whether they are necessarily concomitant or consequent to it, as it exists in the way stated - on the grounds that the same things are present in the body existing in the same way.

220. And this can be understood in two ways: first whether by the ‘necessarily’ is meant necessity absolute and simply, or necessity only in a certain respect - namely that the consequent necessarily follows simply from the positing of the antecedent, or that it follows in a certain respect or by supposition, that is, on the supposition of the existence of the subject of the consequent.

221. First then one must consider necessity simply and secondly necessity in a certain respect.

1. Whether the Natural Parts and Properties of Christ’s Body are Simply Necessarily in the Eucharist as well

a. First Conclusion

222. About the first I say (and let it be the first conclusion) that there is no necessity simply that, if Christ’s body has parts or properties, it have the same ones in sacramental mode.

This is clear in brief because after the [general] resurrection there will be no Eucharist, nor either will Christ’s body have properties or features in that way, and yet it will then have them in its natural way of being.

b. Second Conclusion

223. The second conclusion is that there is no necessity simply the other way, namely that it does not follow simply necessarily that, if the body of Christ has these parts and properties in a sacramental way, it have them for this reason in natural existence.

224. This is plain first as follows: when some existence is indifferent as to two modes, then just as it can be had simply in one mode, so can it also be had simply in the other mode; but the existence simply of Christ’s body (or the thing of Christ’s body simply and really) is indifferent to these two modes, namely natural and sacramental; therefore it can be had in the latter way just as in the former, or even though not in the former.

225. Some say [Aquinas] to this, that the sense of the first premise is when neither mode depends on the other; but it is not so here, because the sacramental mode depends on the natural mode, because the natural mode is the first way the thing in the sacrament exists.

226. On the contrary, and to the main conclusion: existence in the natural mode is not of the essence of existence in the sacramental mode, nor is it the cause of it; therefore the latter does not depend on the former, because nothing depends on something which is not of its essence or cause of it, as it seems.

The first part of the antecedent is plain, because the thing of the Eucharist does not have there its natural mode of being, namely extension; but it would have it if this were of the essence of the existence or mode of being that it has there; for everything that has something has what is of the essence of it.

The proof of the second part of the antecedent is that God is the immediate cause of this existence, name of Christ’s body in the sacrament; therefore the body in its natural existence is not cause of sacramental existence.

227. Again (and it is the same as the prior argument [n.224]), the Eucharist does not depend on that which is neither the sacrament nor the thing of the sacrament, or that is not cause of one or the other; existence in the natural mode is not the sacrament (as is plain), nor is it the thing of the sacrament; rather the thing of the sacrament is existence in another, disparate mode; nor is existence in the natural mode cause of one or the other, as is plain from what has been said [n.226].

228. Again (and this is almost the same), God can cause a thing without any created thing not intrinsic to that thing; existence in the natural mode is not intrinsic to the Eucharist;     therefore etc     .

229. You will say that the major is true of absolute things but not of a relation, because a relation cannot come to be without its foundation and term; but the Eucharist includes a relation, whose term is the existence of the body.

230. On the contrary: although existence is the same in both modes, namely sacramental and natural, yet it is not the term of the relation that is included in the Eucharist in its natural mode but in a disparate mode. Proof: the thing is contained in the Eucharist in the same way that it is the primary signified thing of this sign; for this is the difference between this sacrament and others, that it really contains the first thing it signifies; but existence in the natural mode is not contained here really, but rather in another disparate mode;     therefore etc     .

c. Two Corollaries that Flow from the Second Conclusion

231. From this second conclusion follows a corollary, that before the Incarnation there could have been a Eucharist as true as there is now, and this both as to signification and as to the thing signified and contained.

232. A second corollary is that, after the Incarnation, Christ’s body could have ceased to exist in its natural mode, and yet a true Eucharist would remain both as to the truth of the sign and as to the truth of the thing signified and contained. The consequence is plain, that if from ‘the body of Christ is really contained in the Eucharist’ does not necessarily follow ‘the same body has existence in its natural mode’, then the first could be done without the second, whether it precedes or remains after the destruction of the second.

233. A proof specifically about the first as preceding the second [n.232] is this: wherever a temporal thing can have one real existence, it can simply begin to be there really after it was not. But the body of Christ can simply begin to have one real existence in the sacramental mode of existence; therefore it can simply begin to be in this mode of being, namely in the sacramental mode, after it was not here. Therefore, in order for it to begin simply to be, it is not necessary that it begin to be also in the other mode of being.

234. And if you say that when it begins here it must begin elsewhere at the same time, because, if there is a beginning simply, there is a being of the thing in itself simply; for if it begins to be in another at the same time, then, for there to be a beginning simply, it is no less necessary that it begin to be in itself, because the beginning simply of a thing is the same, just as its being simply is the same; but the being simply of this thing in itself is the being of it in its natural mode. - This response is excluded by the reasons given for the second conclusion [nn.224, 227], because if it [Christ’s body] has real existence in this way as much as in the other (from the first reason), and the latter does not depend on the other (from the second reason), then it follows that it can have a beginning simply in this sacramental mode without having a beginning in the other [natural] mode.

235. One can argue in the same way for the corollary about ‘ceasing to be’ [n.232], because wherever a temporal thing has true existence, then, as long as it remains there, it would not altogether cease to be when it ceased to be in the other mode.

d. Difficulties against the Two Corollaries and their Solution

236. Against the first corollary [n.231] I infer this unacceptable result: therefore the body could begin to be after it was, for the body began to be in the Incarnation, and yet it would have truly been before, if there had been a true Eucharist [before].

237. Against the second corollary [n.232], because then the same body would cease to be after it had ceased to be. Proof: because by ceasing to be in its natural mode it would cease to be, and yet it would remain if a true Eucharist afterwards remained.

238. I say that neither consequence is valid, because what has being simply does not, if it begins to be in another mode, begin to be save in a certain respect. Similarly, what remains in being simply would not, if it ceased to be elsewhere in another mode, cease to be save in a certain respect.

239. As to the argument about the Incarnation [n.236] I say that it would have been possible for that body to have been formed of the blood of the Virgin, and this in its natural mode of existing, notwithstanding the fact that a true Eucharist had preceded. But this formation would not have been the beginning of Christ’s body save in a certain respect, just as now the conversion of the bread into the body is not a beginning of the body save in a certain respect; and the whole reason is that what begins thus to be has being simply beforehand.

240. I speak similarly about the second argument [n.237], that the ceasing to be of the body in the natural mode would not be a ceasing to be save in a certain respect, provided however that the same body remained having the same real existence in the sacramental mode.

241. And if you object that “as it is, there was a beginning simply of Christ’s body in the Incarnation, so there would likewise have thus been a beginning simply if the Eucharist had preceded, for the being of Christ’s body in its natural mode would have been no less true then than now, and consequently, when it acquired that being, his body would, in receiving that sort of being, have had no less true a beginning” - I reply that beginning simply requires not only a beginning to true being and to being simply of that which is said to begin, but also a beginning to the first being of it. But, as it is, there was in the Incarnation a receiving not only of being but also of first being. Then, however, [sc. if the Eucharist had preceded the Incarnation] there would have been a beginning of being simply in one mode, but not the first mode, because the same being simply would have preceded under a different mode [sc. the sacramental mode], and then there would have been a beginning in a certain respect, but now a beginning simply.

242. But if you argue about ceasing to be, that ceasing to be in the natural mode is ceasing to be simply, for corruption in that sense is corruption simply and a corruption everywhere, since if it is not corrupted here then it remains after it was corrupted - I reply that no contradictories are to be admitted about the same thing when there is a distinction in their modes of being (as will be stated immediately). If therefore you are speaking of the corruption that is the separation of part from part (as of the body from the soul, or of the form of corporeity from the matter), then if there is such a corruption of something existing in such a mode, there is also a corruption of it in any mode. Otherwise the same form would inform and not inform the same thing at the same time, and consequently Christ’s body could not be made to be without a soul in the natural mode without it also being made to be without a soul in the sacrament, and vice versa. Nor too could Christ’s body be resolved into matter (the form of corporeity having been here separated from it) without being resolved there, and vice versa.

243. But if we are speaking of a corruption or separation, namely about the total ceasing to be of what is contained in this mode and in the other, Christ’s body could well cease to be here without ceasing to be there, and vice versa, because the whole ceases to have one mode of its existence while retaining the other mode, under each of which modes its total existence is truly preserved.

e. Third Corollary

244. From the above follows a corollary, namely that by the corruption that nature could bring about in the body of Christ, that is, by separation of part from part, it would be necessary for the separation of the parts of this thing to be made in the same way here and there. But through the destruction that God could bring about by his absolute power (a destruction not indeed of the being simply of the thing but of the thing in this mode), the thing would be able not to have that mode of being and yet able to have the other.

245. And if it is objected against this that what is nothing in itself is nothing in something else; therefore if Christ’s body did not have existence, that is, in the natural mode, it could not have existence in the sacrament - I say that if the major is understood by prescinding from every mode of being in something, it is false, for the body of Christ equally truly has its own real being when existing in another and when existing in itself. But if the major is understood in itself, without prescinding but by positing the proper real existence of this body, I concede it. And then I say that if the body is only in the Eucharist, it is not however not in itself, because it truly has being in that way in itself and in the Eucharist, where it exists under the sign [sc. of the Eucharist], just as it does in heaven, where it does not exist in a sign.

2. Whether the Same Parts and Properties are Present by Necessity in a Certain Respect

246. About the second member of the distinction, namely about necessity taken in a certain respect, that is, about the existence of the subject of the consequent [nn.220-221], the conclusion is this, that it is thus necessary for the same properties and parts to be in the body of Christ in this mode of being and in that.

247. Proof: because no absolute thing ceases to be in anything when a new respect comes to it precisely from outside; the properties and parts in the body are truly absolutes; but their presence in the Eucharist is only an extrinsic respect coming to them;     therefore etc     .

248. This can be argued also in accord with what was said in question two of this distinction [nn.30-41, 129-131,], that an absolute thing does not vary because of a variation in relations of ‘where’ and the like; therefore, nothing absolute in a body varies because of its ‘where’ in heaven and because of the presence of it in the Eucharist that is assimilated to a relation ‘where’.

249. Proof of the major of the first reason [n.247]:

Because there is no formal repugnance in such relation to a preexisting ‘where’, nor even is there a virtual repugnance, in the way that a contrary property is repugnant to a subject (as cold is repugnant to fire); because the opposite of this relation [sc. ‘where’] does not arise from the principles of the absolute thing, for then this relation would not be inherent in it contingently nor would it come to it from outside.

Secondly as follows: an absolute is naturally first present in what it is present in before a relation is present that is founded on that absolute, and especially a relation that is extrinsic and comes to the thing contingently. Therefore in that prior moment, before the body is understood to have a new relation in the Eucharist, either its quantity and everything else absolute is present in it, and I have the conclusion proposed, or these are not present and it follows that the contradictories are simply true,That is, the contradictories of asserting and denying of the same subject (Christ’s body) the same quantity and properties. For these properties, being absolute, would belong or not belong to Christ’s body regardless of differences in the extrinsic relation of ‘where’. ¹⁴ for affirmation and negation cannot be said to hold according to diverse features (namely according to this and that ‘where’, or to this or that presence), because just as affirmation is not of a nature to hold because of ‘where’, so neither is negation.

250. This could also be plainly argued as follows: contradictories are not simply true of the same thing in the same respect; nor should one add to ‘the same’ the addition of ‘when the predicate is absolute; a body, if it does not have the absolute here and does have it there, is here the same and at the same time and in the same respect’.

251. The two first conditions are plain [sc. ‘same thing’ and ‘in the same respect’].

252. Proof of the third [one should not add ‘when the predicate is absolute...’], because nothing else is here and there save ‘where’ and ‘where’; but neither absolute affirmation nor absolute negation hold according to ‘where’. This is plain in what is posited here, because a body can well be moved in place here and there, not insofar as these are in it according to different ‘wheres’. And so there is a fallacy of the consequent in arguing thus: ‘it is not moved here, therefore it is not moved’, although it may commonly hold due to the matter [sc. because bodies are commonly in one place; but Christ’s body can be in more than one place]. And likewise, if the same thing had two surfaces, it could well be white according to one and black according to the other; nor would there be contrariety or contradiction, because they would not hold of it according to the same sense. But as to absolute affirmation and the negation of it (provided they do not amount to the same, and provided there is no difference there save that of relations), it is manifest that they will hold according to the same sense, because the relations could not be the reason for which the affirmation and negation would hold [sc. true together], because this reason is naturally posterior to what is absolute.

II. To the Initial Arguments

253. As to the first initial argument [n.203] one must say that he who held the major that ‘nothing can be elsewhere while remaining in its place save by conversion of something else into it’ would have to gloss the proposition about what first begins to be elsewhere, and say that the properties begin to be here concomitantly but not first.

254. But against this:

First, because it at least maintains that something is here without conversion of something else into it, and consequently that conversion is not the proper formal idea, nor the precise change, for being here [n.29]. And besides, the presence of the soul and of the body here are different, because their foundation is different. Therefore, besides the presence by which the body is formally here, one must posit another by which the soul is here, and this presence is not obtained through conversion; therefore the major is false.

255. I respond, therefore, that it poses no difficulty for me, because I do not believe the said proposition to be true, as was said in the first question of this distinction [nn.42-55]. For conversion is not the reason for such presence, nor is change to such presence properly the reason, but the divine power alone, by a different change (which is not conversion), makes it the case that what is elsewhere has this presence here. And divine power can do this for the parts and properties of the body as for the whole body.

256. To the second [n.204]:

Either one holds [n.253] that the body, which is what the species of bread first signifies, does not per se contain the blood as some part of it, according to what was said above in the solution when making the supposition clear [n.214]. And then the response is easy, that the blood is only concomitantly under the species of bread, and then it is not there twice by force of the sacrament, nor yet is it in vain concomitantly under the species of bread, since it is under the species of wine by force of the sacrament, for this is to save the truth of the thing contained, which, wherever it is posited, always has the same absolute features. Nor does it follow that the blood begins to be here after it was here, when speaking of the same mode of being; for it was here concomitantly and begins to be here by force of the consecration.

But if it be held that the blood is per se part of the body as the body is the thing first signified by the species of bread, then one must say that the blood is here twice by force of the sacrament; but still not in the same way, because it is under the species of wine per se and first, for it is the first thing signified by the wine. Now it is under the species of bread per se but not first, rather as something belonging to what is first signified. Nor then is it in vain, because it is per se under the species of bread, so that the truth of the thing first contained may be preserved. Nor does it begin to be after it first was, though it did per se have being there.

257. To the third [n.205] I say that, once the extremes are posited, there is no necessity that a relation coming from outside necessary follow. For such a relation differs in this way from a relation properly speaking, or from a relation that comes from within. But the presence in question here is a relation coming from outside.

258. As to the next [n.206], although Christ’s body could be posited to be here without the other things, namely without the soul and the rest, yet once the existence of the body with these properties and parts is posited, it cannot be here without them, because of the contradiction between affirmation and negation of something absolute under two respects.

259. From this solution [n.258] is made plain what is first in the Eucharist as the thing signified and contained, and what is first concomitantly; for the former is that without which the thing first signified would not have being in a natural mode. And it could also be said that, when the existence of the body here and there has been posited, those things that are in the body under one existence are in it under the other (if one speaks of absolute forms as well). Nor yet does a contradiction follow, namely that it is a quantum and not a quantum; rather it is not a quantum here with a quantity that might be here, but with a quantity that is in heaven.

260. There is the following reason for this: In the case of things that are contingently conjoined with each other and with a same third thing, one of them can agree with that third thing without the other agreeing with it; but the presence of a substance here and the presence of its quantity are contingently conjoined both with each other and in respect of the third thing that is ‘a body being a quantum’; therefore a body can remain a quantum when one presence is posited without the other.

261. And the major seems plain, because there is no reason for their inseparability on their part among themselves, since they are contingently conjoined with each other; nor even is there this reason for inseparability on the part of the third thing, because they are contingently conjoined with that third thing.

262. Proof of the minor:

For it is plain that the presence of the substance of the body and the presence of its quantity are different, and that neither necessarily includes the other, because neither is of the per se essence of the other nor a per se cause of it; therefore they are contingently conjoined with each other.

I prove also the second part of the minor, namely that they are contingently disposed to the third thing that is the body being a quantum, because an absolute form perfects its perfectible object naturally before this sort of perfectible object or the form has a relation coming from outside. And this would be more evident if the argument were about body and soul, for the conjunction of the soul with the body is required for the existence of the composite substance. But the composite substance is naturally prior to any relation coming from outside. Therefore a substance quantum or an animated body does not have this presence or that presence (and this to something extrinsic to them), save as this presence comes to them contingently and as naturally posterior.

263. And this could be briefly argued thus: In the case of what can exist without any conjuncts whose conjunction is contingent, one of these conjuncts can precisely be without the other. The animate body or a substance quantum can be without those two presences, namely the presence of this part of the species of the Eucharist and the presence of that part; and these two presences are contingently conjoined, because neither is per se cause of the other. Therefore a substance quantum or the animate body can be with one presence and not with the other; and then nothing else would exist save that a quantity is informing what it can perfect, but it does not have the double presence the way what it can perfect has; and so what it can perfect has quantum everywhere but not with a quantity that is present everywhere.

264. On the contrary: wherever a body is a quantum, it has there what is the formal principle of being a quantum; but it does not have it there unless it is present there;     therefore etc     .

265. Again, of what sort something is here, of that sort would it be if every other being were in some way or other, possible or not, circumscribed from it; but if quantity were circumscribed under natural being, that body would not be a quantum; therefore it would not be a quantum as it is here.

266. Again, the thing of the Eucharist could be truly contained there without its anywhere having existence in the natural mode, as is plain from the first article of this question or solution [nn.222-245]. But if it were nowhere else and the only thing here first contained is the substance, then the substance would not be a quantum; and the sort it would then be in absolute form, of that sort it is now;     therefore etc     .

267. As to the argument to the contrary [n.222-230], about the contingent conjunction of the presences with each other and with a same third thing composed of absolute parts - the answer is plain from what has already been said (look for the response [nn.222-230]).a

a.a [Interpolation] To the first [n.261] one can speak by distinguishing the major: either it means what has a quantity informing it there, and thus I concede the point; or it means what has a present quantity, and thus I deny it.

     To the second [n.262] I say that quantity is always in a body, whatever sort of quantity it has; rather, although it not have a quantity as here present, yet it has it as informing it, and thus is the body a quantum.

     To the third [n.262] I say that there would be a quantity in the body of Christ, though not in natural mode or with a quantity that is present, but with a quantity that is inherent.

Question Two. Whether any Immanent Action that is in Christ Existing Naturally is the Same in Him as Existing in the Eucharist Sacramentally

268. Proceeding thus to the second question, argument is made that not just any immanent action that is in Christ existing naturally is in him existing sacramentally in the Eucharist; because hearing and vision are not, and so on about sensation universally.

269. The proof first is that the object is not present to him in the due proportion required for such act, meaning the object that is present to him as he is in heaven.

270. Second, because the sense organ does not have here the mode of extension under which, and not otherwise, it is able to receive sensation.

271. Again, third, because between the eye as it is here and the object as it is in heaven there is a barrier preventing the multiplying of color or light;     therefore etc     .

272. Again, fourth, because as he is here he does not sense the things that are present here; therefore much more not any sensible thing in heaven either. The proof of the antecedent is that the sense organ is not here in the mode required for sensation.

273. On the contrary:

Then he would be at the same time seeing and not seeing the same object (and in the same way with other acts of sensing); the consequent is false because contradictories would be present simply in the same thing. The evidence for this reason is plain from the preceding solution, in the second article [n.246-252].

274. Again, operation is the perfection of an operative power, and in it consists the blessedness of the power. On it too follows delight proportioned to the perfection of the operation; all this is plain from Ethics 10.4.1174b18-75a1. Therefore if the eye of Christ, as it is here, were to lack the vision that it has in heaven, it would lack its proper perfection here; and this perfection is its blessedness, in the way that vision can be said to be capable of beatification; it would lack also the perfect delight that is consequent to that perfect operation. And then it would follow that the eye, as it is here, would be wretched, with pain and sadness, because what takes delight away from it is painful and sad; and then it would be simply against its natural sense appetite to have being in the Eucharist.

I. To the Question

A. Three Conclusions

275. I reply that something is said to be in Christ first as he is here because it would be in him if it were in him nowhere else save here. But something is said to be concomitantly in him here because it is in him first as he is elsewhere, and so is in him as he is here because of identity of subject and form.

276. Accordingly, therefore, the first conclusion is this, namely that every operation that is in Christ first as he is in heaven, is in him concomitantly as he is here.

277. The second conclusion is that no act of sensation can be in Christ first as he is in the Eucharist.

278. The third conclusion is that spiritual operation (namely of intellect and will) can be in Christ first as he is in the Eucharist.

B. Proof of the Conclusions

1. Proof of the First Conclusion

a. Universally

279. Proof of the first conclusion.

First in general as follows, that nothing absolute ceases to be in another because of a new respect coming from outside; but operation is an absolute form, as was shown in Rep. IA d.3 nn.169-174; therefore, the operation does not cease to be in its subject because of a new presence, which is a new respect coming from outside. And evidence for this reason can be obtained from the end of the solution of the preceding question, where this reason was more fully dealt with [nn.246-252].

280. Some say [Henry of Ghent] to this that the major is true of absolute form simply; but operation is not thus absolute, because it requires the relation of power to object.

281. On the contrary: some qualities depend thus in their coming to be on the closeness of the agent to the passive subject, as is plain of heat and cold and other qualities that alteration is toward; and yet in their being simply they are absolute. And according to everyone, all such qualities, absolute ones as well, that were in the body of Christ on the cross, were also in the pyx.

282. Likewise too, in their coming to be they do not require such a relation, and that when they are present concomitantly and not first; for it is apparent that if Christ’s body on the cross grew cold, the cold was also in the body of Christ as it is in the pyx, but not first. And for the latter coming to be there was not required a closeness of the agent there to the passive subject; so, by similarity, since this quality is in itself absolute, although it requires in its coming to be the presence of the object to the power and this will only be where it is present first, so it can come to be concomitantly without any such respect.

283. They reply that operation includes a relation more than other forms about which there is argument do (as heat and the like), because the latter require only a relation of agent to passive subject, and this where they come to be first; but after their coming to be in their proper being, they do not require this sort of relation; but operation is in continuous coming to be, and therefore it requires the continuous closeness of power to the object. From this it seems that it is more repugnant for operation to come to be or to be present without such relation than it is for heat.

284. I say that although it continuously come to be, yet it does not follow that it cannot be concomitantly present and continuously come to be without the presence of the object. For just as heat can come to be in the body in the Eucharist without the closeness of the agent as there, so if the being of heat were to come to be, it could be always caused and always remain in the body and in the host, and yet without such closeness as to ‘where’. For a continuous relation to continuous coming to be does not seem to be required more than a relation then present is required for transient coming to be.

285. And if you object [Henry of Ghent] that “for operation there is required not only the object as cause, because it is a cause in becoming, but in addition its presence in the idea of term of the operation; so just as it impossible for there to be an operation and for it not to terminate at the object, so it is impossible that an operation be in something somewhere and not terminate there in an object present to it” - I say that the presence of the object in itself is needed not because there is a term to the act but only because there is a cause of it, so that when some sufficient cause of the act is posited the presence of the object is not needed to be the term of it (the point is plain about seeing a creature in the divine essence; if the divine essence were the cause of that seeing, the object, which is the term of the seeing, is not required to be present in its own proper presence).

b. Specifically

286. This first conclusion is, second, proved specifically because ‘every understanding that is in Christ here is also in him there’; for every such operation now abstracts from here and now; but if Christ’s soul were to understand precisely according to the mode of understanding of a soul that is a wayfarer, it would not have intuitive understanding of this or that object without concomitant sensation of the same; therefore since it would have that understanding the same here as there, it follows that it would also have the requisite sensation for it here and there.

287. It is proved third as follows, because the passion of sense appetite, such as pain, would be the same here as there; therefore the sensation would be the same. The proof of the antecedent is that death would thus have followed here as there; but it followed there on extreme pain; therefore here too. The proof of the first consequence is that there is no same effect without the same cause, and this when not positing a miracle and when meaning a natural cause precisely; but pain is an effect of sensation or of an object that is sensed; therefore there cannot be the same pain without, in the absence of a miracle, the same sensation.

288. Some reply [Richard of Middleton] that an act of imagination in Christ would be sufficient for this, namely for the pain.

289. Against this in two ways:

First: the response destroys itself, for it is not possible for an act of imagination to be in something in which an act of sense cannot be, because imagination is a movement caused by sense, On the Soul 3.3.428b11-12.

Second, because imagination is not the cause of the same specific pain as is the pain caused by external sense; otherwise someone dreaming would be pained with a pain of the same species as the pain of someone awake.

2. Proof of the Second Conclusion

290. The proof of the second main conclusion is as follows, that the organ of sense is not in Christ’s body in the Eucharist in the way required for being affected by the object, because if it is to be affected by a body-object it must have a quantitative mode and be located in a place; likewise, Christ’s body as it is in the Eucharist does not have the object near it. For it is present here to a body as agent as if it were not present, because it is here as if, as far as concerns the idea of being affected by a body, it were nowhere; for every body requires a passive subject locally next to it. But Christ’s body is not here by location, but only the sacramental species is here in that way; nor is Christ’s body more present here to any body with the idea of being a passive subject than if an angel were here; therefore no sensation can be first in Christ’s body as it exists in the Eucharist.

3. Proof of the Third Conclusion

291. The third conclusion, that the operation of intellect and will can be first in Christ in the Eucharist, is proved as follows: the now beatified soul of Christ understands as an angel does insofar as it does not depend on the senses nor on sensible things in its understanding; therefore just as an angel existing somewhere could intuitively understand an object proportionally present to him, so the soul of Christ existing in the same place can intuit that same object; therefore the soul of Christ, as it is here, can now intuitively understand the intelligible objects that are present here to him, just as an angel could see (intuitively that is) an angel that was present here and the soul of a priest.

292. But this intuition is in the soul of Christ first as it is here, because it is not in that soul first as it is in heaven (if one supposes that an extreme distance impedes created intuitive understanding), just as neither would an angel existing in heaven see intuitively whatever, as present here, he might see intuitively here.

293. From this follows a corollary, that Christ, because of his being in the Eucharist, is not only not deprived of any operation he has in heaven, but as he is in the Eucharist he has some operation first which as a consequence he has concomitantly in heaven, namely the intellection and volition of any object that an angel here present would have intellection and volition of. And as a result, his presence in the Eucharist does not tend to his imperfection but to his greater perfection.

II. To the Initial Arguments

294. To the first argument [n.268] I say that all sensation of the same object that is in Christ’s senses as he is in heaven, is in the same senses in the Eucharist, as was proved in the first conclusion through the three ways [nn.279, 286-287].

To the proof for the opposite [n.269] I say that an object present in due proportion is only required for an act of sensing when the object is in some way cause of sensation, and cause of it as it first comes to be.

295. To the second [n.270] I say that the organ is truly a quantum here just as in heaven, and consequently it can receive sensation notwithstanding the fact that sensation is only received in a quantum; but it does not have here a quantitative mode, that is, coextension with the quantum to which it is present, nor does it fill place. And therefore sensation cannot be in it first as it is here. For this quantitative mode is required in the eye for sensation to be in it first. But it is not required for sensation to be in it, or come to be in it, concomitantly, because this sort of quantitative mode is not necessary for receiving sensation, but it is only a required condition by reference to the first transmuting agent.

296. To the third proof [n.271] I say (and it is plain from the same point that has already been made [nn.294-295]) that the obstacle is only an obstacle to sensation coming to be or being present first.

297. As to the fourth argument [n.272] I deny the consequence, for the antecedent is true from the second conclusion of the solution [n.277], but the consequent is false from the first conclusion [n.276]. The reason the consequence fails is plain from what has been said, that in order to sense the things here sensation would have to be in the eye first as it is here; for the sensation cannot be in the eye first as it is in heaven, because the sensible object is not present to the eye as it is in heave. But for sensation of some object to be concomitantly in the eye as it is here, it is sufficient that the same thing be proportionally present to the eye as it is somewhere, and that it be able to be first present to it as it is there. And such is how it is with objects that Christ’s senses perceive as he is in heaven.

Question Three. Whether any Bodily Motion could be in Christ’s Body as it Exists in the Eucharist

298. Proceeding thus to the third question, argument is made that bodily motion could be in Christ’s body as it is in the Eucharist.

First, because one and the same thing cannot be continuous and non-continuous at the same time, for continuity precedes ‘where’ and is an absolute form; but Christ’s body on the cross was non-continuous, speaking of the division made by the wounds;     therefore in the pyx it was not continuous but divided simply; therefore it was made non-continuous from being continuous, and consequently it was moved with bodily motion.

299. Second: nutrition relates to substance, therefore the same thing cannot be nourished and not nourished; Christ’s body was nourished in natural existence; therefore it would have been nourished in sacramental existence. But nutrition is a bodily change; therefore etc     .

300. Third as follows: when we move, everything in us moves;     therefore when the host moves, the body of Christ in the host moves; but this motion is bodily, therefore etc     ., because it moves from one ‘where’ to another ‘where’. And there is a confirmation, because it is impossible for something to have different ‘wheres’ without motion or change; Christ’s body has different ‘wheres’ when the host is moved;     therefore etc     .

301. Fourth as follows: a subject that has the dispositions requisite for receiving another form is able to receive it; the body of Christ has here all the dispositions requisite for the reception of heat and cold, because whatever the reasons are for receiving these qualities in the body of Christ as naturally existing, these qualities are present in the body of Christ here;     therefore the body of Christ as it is here can receive heat and cold, and consequently it can move bodily with the motion of alteration in the third species of quality [Categories].

302. On the contrary:

Physics 5.1.225a31, “Everything that is in motion is located in place;” the body of Christ as it is in the sacrament is not located in place; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

A. Preliminary Distinctions

303. To understand the solution of this question I put first certain distinctions.

First about motion:

304. For motion can be understood strictly; not, I say, by distinguishing motion from change, as the divisible from the indivisible, but by taking motion as indifferent to divisible and indivisible change. However, strictly motion is taken according to motion toward the terms toward which motion properly is, according to the Philosopher, namely substance, quantity, quality, and ‘where’, Physics 5.1.224b35-225a20, 225a34-b9.

Motion can also be taken more extensively in another way, insofar as it states any receiving of any new form, whether absolute or relational, and relational either as belonging to ‘where’ properly, or as belonging to ‘where’ by some likeness or reduction, of the sort that the presence of Christ’s body here under the species is, as was touched on in the first question of this distinction [nn.49-55].

305. I distinguish second that the body of Christ can be understood to move with a motion (taken in either way) first or concomitantly. And the idea of the members of this division is plain from the beginning of the preceding solution [nn.275-276].

306. Third I distinguish, on the part of the agent, that a body’s being moved in this way or that, with such or such motion, can be understood to be caused by created virtue or immediately by God.

B. Solution Consisting of Six Conclusions

1. Statement of the Conclusions

307. Accordingly the solution of the question will consist of six conclusions.

The first is this: the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist cannot be moved first, with motion or change properly speaking, by created power.

308. The second is this, that it can be moved, with motion properly speaking, immediately by God.

309. The third is this, that it can be moved, and moved first, with motion taken in extended sense.

310. The fourth is that it can only be moved in this way and with this motion immediately by God.

311. The fifth is this, that it can be moved concomitantly and moved to absolute form with any motion that it is moved by first as it is in heaven, and by the same agent as it is moved by there.

312. The sixth conclusion is that it is not moved concomitantly with the local motion it is moved first by as it is in heaven, nor by any motion similar to local motion.

2. Proof of the Conclusions

a. Proof of the First Conclusion

313. The proof of the first conclusion is as follows, that no created virtue acts on a body unless it is proportionally close to it in place; the body of Christ is not in a place here and so is close to nothing as to place; rather only the species, under which is the body, is close to any agent with the closeness that can be possessed as to the ‘where’. But I said ‘no created virtue’, because although it is more manifest about a body than about an angel, yet an angel, if it acts on a body by really changing it, requires that body really to be close to it in place, or at least to have existence in place, because an angel’s virtue is not able to cause any motion in a body without that body’s ‘where’ being presupposed.

b. Proof of the Second Conclusion

314. The second conclusion is proved by the fourth reason given for the first part [n.301], because every disposition necessary for receiving heat that Christ’s body has as it exists in heaven it also has as it exists here; therefore its receiving heat is not repugnant to it as it is here, even though it be, per possibile or per impossibile, nowhere else. And consequently, since divine virtue can impress on any passive subject any form that that subject is able to receive, it follows that God could change his body, as it is first here, toward heat.

c. Proof of the Third Conclusion

315. The third conclusion is plain from the fact we maintain that, after the consecration, the body of Christ is truly everywhere that the host is; therefore, because of the uniform presence of the body with the host, and because this host has a primary presence in different places according to the different containing things it is in, the result is that the body of Christ has different presences with the different containers. But these different presences are not without change broadly understood, and the change is in the body first as it is here, because in no way does Christ’s body as it is in heaven have one or other presence, indeed it has neither.

316. And if you ask “Could it [Christ’s body] not be present in different ways, and not just in respect of that which, as containing the species [of bread], contains it (so that it would be present by being concomitant with what contains the species), but would it not also be present because of the species and would it not begin to have a new presence because of the other species [of wine]?” - I say that the presence of Christ’s body with the species is necessary, not simply, but only by divine ordination, which the Church has certified. So God could, of his absolute power, make his body not present with the species in this way while the species remains; and make it present with the air containing the host in this way, and also successively present now with one part of the air and now with another. He could in this way even transfer the body from the place of the host to any part of the universe, and always under the same mode of existing, that is, non-locally and while another body is filling the place.

d. Proof of the Foruth Conclusion

317. The proof of the fourth conclusion is that what in no way has a moving power over anything when that thing exists per se, does not move it per accidens when that thing is with another thing with which it does not make a unity, the way act and potency make a unity. But created virtue has altogether no power over the body of Christ in itself as it exists in this way, so as to move it. Therefore when that body is under something else to which it is not disposed as potency nor as act, the result is that the created power will not be able to move that body, not even per accidens. But Christ’s body is under the host in this way, as is plain, because the species is not the form of the body nor the body the form of the species.

318. If the major here [n.317] is denied [Richard of Middleton], because a heavy object in a ship is moved by the mover of the ship, although the heavy object is not the form of the ship nor conversely - the objection is not to the purpose, because the moving power of the ship could act on a heavy object per se if it were heavy per se; and therefore I added in the major ‘neither of which is the act of the other’, because although a thing that is the act of something could not per se be moved by anything, yet it could per accidens be moved by the same thing that can move the whole of which it is the act.

319. But in order to remove all objection against the major, let this major be taken: “When certain things are conjoined by an act precisely of will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, then if one of these things is something in itself movable that is altogether disproportionate to some mover and the other is proportionate to it, the mover cannot move both of the conjoined things with the same motion.” The point is plain, because if the mover moves the one proportionate to it, not for this reason does it per accidens move the other, because the other is not present to the thing moved, neither as act of its potency, nor conversely, nor is it present simply from any necessity natural to it (as the heavy object is present to that on which it rests and is, for this reason, moved along with it). Rather it is only present to it by a will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, and this will is consequently able not to will the conjunction while nevertheless the motion of the other of them continues.

320. An example of this: if an angel were voluntarily to make himself present to a stone, then if I move the stone, not for this reason do I move the angel, because the angel is not movable per se by my power, nor per accidens in this case, because he is not the form nor a part of anything movable by me. If therefore an angel were, at the end of the motion, present to the stone that was moved by me, this would not be by my act but by the angel’s own proper action, whereby he would make himself present there.

321. In the same way in the matter at issue; since Christ’s body is present to the species only by act of divine will, then if I make the species to have a new ‘where’, the body will not be there by that motion, because the presence, new or old, of the body is not subject to my will, not even per accidens, because it is neither form nor part of what is subject to my motion.

322. On the contrary [Richard of Middleton]: whatever moves something per se, moves per accidens whatever is in it; therefore the created virtue that per se moves the host moves per accidens the body that is per se in the host.

323. Secondly: because otherwise a new miracle would be performed every time a priest moves the host, because this moving could not be done, nor the truth of the Eucharist preserved, without special divine dispensation.

324. To the first [n.322] I say that the first proposition is false, unless it be understood of that which is in the moved thing either as act in a potency or as part in a whole or as something conjoined by natural necessity (as a heavy thing is conjoined with what it rests on). For if this thing is contingently conjoined with that thing by act of will, when the one moves it will not for this reason move the other. Rather there is need that the will, which is cause of the conjoining, be also cause of the motion of that which is not conjoined by any natural necessity to the moved thing. So it is in the matter at issue. And the thing is plain from the example about the angel; for what moves the stone per se does not for this reason move the angel per accidens.

325. To the second [n.323] I say that there is no new miracle, because God, by the same miracle by which he instituted the Eucharist in the Church, has determined to make the body of Christ always present to the species after consecration. And therefore, as long as the species, however it is moved, remains, God’s making Christ’s body to be present with the presence of something else (speaking of presence with respect to what contains a thing, the way the species, as primarily contained in place, has different presences) is not a new miracle but the previous determination of the divine will. Just as if an angel had determined that he would always be with this stone, his being moved with the movement of the stone would not be said to be a miraculous operation by the angel. Nor yet would he who moves the stone move the angel by his action, but the angel would move by his own will.

e. Proof of the Fifth Conclusion

326. The fifth conclusion is proved by the proof that was set down about absolute form, in both the first question and the second question of this part [nn.247, 279]: because an absolute is not varied by variation in an extrinsic respect, nor does it cease to be because of a new respect coming from outside. And there is the same reasoning about an absolute in being as about an absolute in coming to be.

327. This conclusion can be proved in particular by running through the changes that are changes to absolute form.

First then about alteration, because if the body is primarily hot in its natural existence it is concomitantly hot in the sacrament, according to what everyone concedes.

328. Likewise about increase and decrease, because if a part of quantity were to come to the body or depart from the body in its natural existence, it would similarly come to it and depart from it in the Eucharist, because the body has the same parts in one mode of existing as it has in another, from the first question of this part [nn.246-247].

329. Likewise about nutrition, because nutrition is the addition of a part to the whole thing to be nourished, but no part can be added here that is not added there.

330. In the same way about the diminution and corruption opposite to nutrition; if a part is lost from the body in its natural existence, it does not remain a part of the body in the sacrament, nor conversely. And yet I do not say that, if the body were corrupted in its natural existence, it would for this reason be corrupted in the Eucharist. Here one must note that corruption is properly speaking separation of the form from the matter, which matter remains afterwards in a state of privation of form.

331. But if the body were corrupted in its natural existence it would not remain as matter without form in the Eucharist.

332. I explain this as follows, that the soul first perfects what is first perfectible by it, namely the whole organic body; but the soul only perfects the parts of the body because they are some part of what is first perfectible; therefore, when the form of the whole organic body ceases, nothing is formed by the soul.

333. In the same way universally, when something belongs first to a whole and to a part only because it belongs to the whole, then with the destruction of the whole in its ordering to this something, the part does not have the same ordering to it. But now the first thing signified by the Eucharist is the body composed of matter and form (whether body includes the blood or not, I do not care; this was touched on in question one of this part [nn.215-217]). Therefore, when any whole under the idea of what is first signified no longer remains, nothing of what it is as per se signified remains.

334. But when the form is separated from the matter in its natural existence, that which is first signified does not remain in the Eucharist, because then the matter would have and not have the form at the same time. Therefore, at that moment nothing at all of the thing signified remains. For the matter does not remain under the form, because this would be a contradiction. Nor does the matter remain without any form, because it is not contained here save because it is part of a whole. Nor does matter under any other form remain, because it would have and not have that other form at the same time.

335. On the contrary: it was conceded before, in question one of this part [nn.223-235], that the thing of the Eucharist could remain although the body would nowhere have its natural existence; indeed when it is posited that it would be corrupted in its natural existence. Therefore, although the body would be corrupted in that natural existence, it does not follow that it could not remain truly the same as it is the thing of the Eucharist.

336. I reply that the ceasing to be of the body in its natural existence can be whole and total, as if there were annihilation; and there would truly be annihilation if the body were not anywhere; however, the same whole would remain here in another mode of existence. But if there is corruption there, it is partial destruction, namely separation of part from remaining part, and the separation cannot be there without the existence of a like separation everywhere; nor can the separation stand here with the fact that something of the body is in the sacrament, because nothing of the body is in the sacrament save as it is part of the whole. But a material part, separated from a formal part or from a natural form, is not part of the whole; therefore this inference does not hold, ‘if it can cease to be there without ceasing to be here, then it can be corrupted there and not be corrupted here’, because the first includes no contradiction; for it only posits that one respect remains in something absolute while the other respect does not; but the second does posit a contradiction, namely that the same absolute form is informing and not informing the same thing, when only a variation in relation has been posited.

337. But if you say that in both places the form does not inform the matter, on the contrary: because it is against the truth of this sacrament that a part of the body is contained in it unless the whole body be first contained in it; and so the matter without form will in no way be contained here, nor consequently will it be able to be corrupted as it is here, although the whole could be corrupted as it is here, because the matter cannot be changed as it is here from form to privation, which change is what is meant by corruption; rather ‘matter ceasing to have form’ is its ceasing to be part of the whole, and consequently ceasing to be as it is here.A proof of the sixth conclusion is not offered because the conclusion is already plain from what was said in proof of the first and second conclusions [nn.313-314], and will be plain from the response to the fourth initial argument [n.345]. ¹⁵

3. Synthesis of the Statements Made

338. From the first two conclusions is clear how the body of Christ, as it is here, could be moved first (with motion properly speaking) and by what.

339. From the third and fourth conclusions is plain how the body of Christ as it is here could be moved first, with motion taken in extended sense, and by what.

340. From the fifth and sixth is plain how it could be moved concomitantly and with what motion and by what mover.

II. To the Initial Arguments

341. As to the first reason [n.298], although it be said that Christ’s body was wounded on the cross and not in the pyx, yet I reply that wounding can be taken for the formal division of parts of something continuous, or for the division itself as inflicted by a body [sc. weapon] as it there enters and divides the parts of a body.

If in the first way then the body would have been divided in the pyx just as it was on the cross, provided the argument is made that “continuity and non-continuity cannot be preserved because there are different ‘wheres’.”

If in the second way, it is true, because the division was not made in the body first as it is in the pyx. Also, there would have been this division of parts of the body in the pyx by comparing it to the whole of which they are parts, but not by comparing it to the containing place, because the divided parts would not have had ‘wheres’ spatially distant as the divided parts on the cross did. And the reason is that the parts of the body on the cross had bodily extension corresponding to the extension of the containing place; and therefore to the division of them in the whole there corresponded a distinction in the parts of the containing place. But the parts are not like this in the Eucharist; hence the parts there, divided and discontinuous as in the whole, would not have had distinct parts of the containing place corresponding to them.

342. Hereby can be solved an argument that is made to the second part, because if fluid could be in two places, here in a sealed jar and there in a perforated jar, it would as a result remain continuous here but flow out there - I reply that the parts, in comparison with the whole, would have continuity here and there in the same way; but in comparison with the container, they could have the corresponding continuity of the container here, and an unlike corresponding continuity there.

343. As to the second reason about nutrition [n.299], it is plain that it would have belonged to the body as it exists in both places, taking ‘nutrition’ for adding a part of substance to the whole nourished thing. But from this does not follow a bodily change of the body first as it is here, because the change would not be by nutriment nearby to the body as the body is here, but the change would only be here concomitantly, because of the conversion elsewhere of nutriment that was nearby elsewhere, and because of the identity of the substance here and there, which substance must have the same parts everywhere.

344. As to the third [n.300], it is plain how and by what Christ’s body is moved, taking motion in the extended sense in the third conclusion [nn.309, 315].

345. As to the fourth [n.301] I concede what it proves, namely that the body can be absolutely moved first there with a bodily motion strictly speaking. But it cannot be so moved by anyone, but by God immediately as was said in the second conclusion [nn.308, 314]; and not by anyone else, even concomitantly, because a created agent, in order to change a body, needs to have it nearby, while God can act on a body however much it exists without location in place; for God’s power has regard to a passive subject absolutely according as it is receptive of the term [of action]; but God’s power does not regard it precisely in the accidental conditions of closeness or distance in place, which are necessary for any natural agent.

346. Here one needs to understand, following the argument about nutrition [n.343], that if a body is only nourished here concomitantly, because it is nourished first elsewhere, and its nutrition is necessary for the preservation of natural life, then the body cannot continue in life here without concomitantly continuing in life elsewhere. And from this follows that if it were nowhere else in natural mode then either it would die from lack of already digested nutriment, or it would remain perpetually in mortal life without taking in nutriment. Note, therefore, that if it were nowhere located in place but only existed sacramentally, it would remain there perpetually in the same way of being in which it had begun to be there. For it could no more die there than it could be nourished there. Therefore it would be possible for a body here to live, in some mode of being, with mortal life and yet do so immortally without also taking in food and without breathing and without having the other things that are commonly required for mortal life.